Abstract. We describe the design and implementation of efficient signature and key-exchange schemes for the AVR ATmega and ARM Cortex M0 microcontrollers, targeting the 128-bit security level. Our algorithms are based on an efficient Montgomery ladder scalar multiplication on the Kummer surface of Gaudry and Schost's genus-2 hyperelliptic curve, combined with the Jacobian point recovery technique of Costello, Chung, and Smith. Our results are the first to show the feasibility of software-only hyperelliptic cryptography on constrained platforms, and represent a significant improvement on the elliptic-curve state-of-the-art for both key exchange and signatures on these architectures. Notably, our key-exchange scalar-multiplication software runs in under 9740k cycles on the ATmega, and under 2650k cycles on the Cortex M0.
Introduction
The current state of the art in asymmetric cryptography, not only on microcontrollers, is elliptic-curve cryptography; the most widely accepted reasonable security is the 128-bit security level. All current speed records for 128-bit secure key exchange and signatures on microcontrollers are held-until now-by elliptic-curve-based schemes. Outside the world of microcontrollers, it is well known that genus-2 hyperelliptic curves and their Kummer surfaces present an attractive alternative to elliptic curves. For example, the current speed record for 128-bit-secure scalar multiplication on a range of architectures is held by Kummer-based software presented at Asiacrypt 2014 by Bernstein, Chuengsatiansup, Lange, and Schwabe [3] . These speed records were achieved by exploiting the computational power of vector units of recent "large" processors such as Intel Sandy Bridge, Ivy Bridge, and Haswell, or the ARM Cortex-A8. Surprisingly, very little attention has been given to Kummer surfaces on embedded processors. Indeed, this is the first work showing the feasibility of software-only implementations of hyperelliptic-curve based crypto on constrained platforms. There have been some investigations of binary hyperelliptic curves targeting the much lower 80-bit security level, but those are actually examples of softwarehardware co-design showing that using hardware acceleration for field operations was necessary to get reasonable performance figures (see eg. [1] and [15] ).
In this paper we investigate the potential of genus-2 hyperelliptic curves for both key exchange and signatures on the "classical" 8-bit AVR ATmega architecture, and the more modern 32-bit ARM Cortex-M0 processor. We show that not only are hyperelliptic curves competitive, they clearly outperform state-of-the art elliptic-curve schemes in terms of speed and size. For example, our variablebasepoint scalar multiplication on a 127-bit Kummer surface is 31% faster on AVR and 26% faster on the M0 than the recently presented speed records for Curve25519 software by Düll, Haase, Hinterwälder, Hutter, Paar, Sánchez, and Schwabe [10] ; our implementation is also smaller, and requires less RAM.
We use a recent result by Costello, Chung, and Smith [9] to also set new speed records for 128-bit secure signatures. Specifically, we present a new signature scheme based on fast Kummer surface arithmetic. It is inspired by the EdDSA construction by Bernstein, Duif, Lange, Schwabe, and Yang [4] . On the ATmega, it produces shorter signatures, achieves higher speeds and needs less RAM than the Ed25519 implementation presented in [21] . Table 1 . Cycle counts and stack usage in bytes of all functions related to the signature and key exchange schemes, for the AVR ATmega and ARM Cortex M0 microcontrollers.
Our routines handling secret data are constant-time, and are thus naturally resistant to timing attacks. These algorithms are built around the Montgomery ladder, which improves resistance against simple-power-analysis (SPA) attacks. Resistance to DPA attacks can be easily obtained by randomizing the scalar and/or Jacobian points. Re-randomizing the latter after each ladder step also guarantees resistance against horizontal types of attacks.
Source code. We place all of the software described in this paper into the public domain, to maximize reuseability of our results. The software is available at http://www.cs.ru.nl/~jrenes/.
High-level overview
We begin by describing the details of our signature and Diffie-Hellman schemes, explaining the choices we made in their design. Concrete details on their implementation appear in §3 and §4 below. Experimental results and comparisons follow in §5.
Signatures
Our signature scheme adheres closely to the proposal of [9, §8] , which in turn is a type of Schnorr signature [24] . There are however some differences, and some possible trade-offs, which we discuss below. The full scheme is presented at the end of this section.
Group structure. We build the signature scheme on top of the group structure from the Jacobian J C (F q ) of a genus-2 hyperelliptic curve C. More specifically, C is the Gaudry-Schost curve over the prime field F q with q = 2 127 − 1 (cf. §3.2). The Jacobian is a group of order #J C (F q ) = 2 4 N , where
is a 250-bit prime. For more details on the Jacobian and its elements, see §3.3.
Hash function. The hash function H can be any hash function with a 128-bit security level. For our purposes, H(M ) = SHAKE128(M, 512) suffices [11] . While SHAKE128 has variable-length output, we shall only use the 512-bit output implementation.
Encoding. The objects on which we operate on the highest level are points Q in J C (F q ). To minimize communication costs, we compress the common 508-bit representation of Q into 256 bits (see §3.3). To avoid confusion between compressed and uncompressed points, we let Q denote the 256-bit encoding of Q. (This notation is the same as in [4] .)
Public generator. The public generator can be any element P of J C (F q ) such that [N ]P = 0. In our implementation we have made the arbitrary choice P = (
, where
This is the point which we use the most for scalar multiplication. Since it remains fixed, we assume we have its decompressed representation precomputed, so as to avoid having to perform the relatively expensive decompression operation whenever we need a scalar multiplication; this gives a low-cost speed gain. We further assume we have a "wrapped" representation of the projection of P to the Kummer surface, which is used to speed up the xDBLADD function. See §4.1 for more details on the xWRAP function.
Public keys. In contrast to the public generator, we assume public keys are compressed: they are communicated much more frequently, and we therefore benefit much more from smaller keys. Moreover, we include the public key in one of the hashes during the sign operation [18, 20] , computing h = H(R||Q||M ) instead of the h = H(R||M ) originally suggested by Schnorr [24] . This protects against adversaries attacking multiple public keys simultaneously.
Compressed signatures. Schnorr [24] Verification efficiency. The most costly operation in signature verification is the two-dimensional scalar multiplication
In [9] , the authors propose an algorithm relying on the differential addition chains presented in [2] . However, since we are using compressed signatures, we have a small scalar h 128 .
To abuse this, we simply compute [s]P and [h 128 ]Q separately using the fast scalar multiplication on the Kummer surface and finally add them together on the Jacobian. Not only do we need fewer cycles, but we can also reduce code size by reusing the one-dimensional scalar multiplication routines.
The scheme. We now define our signature scheme, taking the remarks above into account. For key exchange it is not necessary to have a group structure; it is enough to have a pseudo-multiplication. We can therefore carry out our the key exchange directly on the Kummer surface K C = J C / ± , gaining efficiency by not projecting from and recovering to the Jacobian J C . If Q is a point on J C , then its image in K C is ±Q. The common representation for points in K C (F q ) is a 512-bit 4-tuple of field elements. For input points (i. e. the generator or public keys), we prefer the 384-bit "wrapped" representation (see §3.5). This not only reduces key size, but it also allows a speed-up in the core xDBLADD subroutine. The wrapped representation of a point ±Q on K C is denoted by ±Q.
Key generation (keygen
Key exchange (dh_exchange). Let d be a 256-bit secret key, and ±P the public generator (respectively public key). Compute ±Q ← ±[d]P . The generated public key (respectively shared secret) is ±Q.
Remark 2. While it might be possible to reduce the key size even further to 256 bits, we would then have to pay the cost of compressing and decompressing, and also wrapping for xDBLADD (see the discussion in [9, App. A]). We therefore choose to keep the 384-bit representation, which is consistent with [3] .
Building blocks: algorithms and their implementation
We begin by presenting the finite field F 2 127 −1 in §3.1. We then define the curve C in §3.2, before giving basic methods for the elements of J C in §3.3. We then present the fast Kummer K C and its differential addition operations in §3.4.
The field F q
We work over the prime finite field F q , where q is the Mersenne prime
We let M, S, a, s, and neg denote the costs of multiplication, squaring, addition, subtraction, and negation in F q . Later, we will define a special operation for multiplying by small constants: its cost is denoted by m c . We can represent elements of F q as 127-bit values; but since the ATmega and Cortex M0 work with 8-and 32-bit words, respectively, the obvious choice is to represent field elements with 128 bits. That is, an element g ∈ F q is represented as g = 15 i=0 g i 2 8i on the AVR ATmega platform and as g = 3 i=0 g i 2 32i on the Cortex M0, where g i ∈ {0, . . . ,
For complete field arithmetic we implement modular reduction, addition, subtraction, multiplication, and inversion. We comment on some important aspects here, giving cycle counts in Table 2 .
Working with the prime field F q , we need integer reduction modulo q; this is implemented as bigint_red. Reduction is very efficient because 2 128 ≡ 2 mod q, which enables us to reduce using only shifts and integer additions. Given this reduction, we implement addition and subtraction operations for F q (as gfe_add and gfe_sub, respectively) in the obvious way.
The most costly operations in F q are multiplication (gfe_mul) and squaring (gfe_sqr), which are implemented as 128 × 128-bit bit integer operations (bigint_mul and bigint_sqrt) followed by a call to bigint_red. Since we are working on the same platforms as in [10] in which both of these operations are already highly optimized, we chose to take the necessary code for bigint_mul and bigint_sqr from those implementations:
-On the AVR ATmega: The authors of [17] implement a 3-level Karatsuba multiplication of two 256-bit integers, representing elements f of
Since the first level of Karatsuba relies on a 128 × 128-bit integer multiplication routine named MUL128, we simply lift this function out to form a 2-level 128 × 128-bit Karatsuba multiplication. Similarly, their 256 × 256-bit squaring relies on a 128 × 128-bit routine SQR128, which we can (almost) directly use. Since the 256 × 256-bit squaring is 2-level Karatsuba, the 128×128-bit squaring is 1-level Karatsuba.
-On the ARM Cortex M0: The authors of [10] make use of optimized Karatsuba multiplication and squaring. In this case their assembly code does not rely on subroutines, but fully inlines 128 × 128-bit multiplication and squaring. The 256×256-bit multiplication and squaring are both 3-level Karatsuba implementations. Hence, using these, we end up with 2-level 128 × 128-bit Karatsuba multiplication and squaring.
The function gfe_invert computes inversions in F q as exponentiations, using the fact that g
To do this efficiently we use an addition chain for q − 2, doing the exponentiation in 10M + 126S.
Finally, to speed up our Jacobian point decompression algorithms, we define a function gfe_powminhalf which computes g → g −1/2 for g in F q (up to a choice of sign). To do this, we note that g −1/2 = ±g −(q+1)/4 = ±g (3q−5)/4 in F q ; this exponentiation can be done with an addition chain of length 136, using 11M+125S. We can then define a function gfe_sqrtinv, which given (x, y) and a bit b, computes ( √ x, 1/y) as (±xyz, xyz 2 ) where z = gfe_powminhalf(xy 2 ), choosing the sign so that the square root has least significant bit b. Including the gfe_powminhalf call, this costs 15M + 126S + 1neg.
The curve C and its theta constants
We define the curve C "backwards", starting from its (squared) theta constants From these, we define the dual theta constants
Observe that projectively, Crucially, all of these constants can be represented using just 16 bits. Since Kummer arithmetic involves many multiplications by these constants, we implement a separate 16 × 128-bit multiplication function gfe_mulconst. For the AVR ATmega, we store the constants in two 8-bit registers. For the Cortex M0, the values fit into a halfword; this works well with the 16×16-bit multiplication. Multiplication by any of these 16-bit constants costs m c . Continuing, we define e/f := (1 + α)/(1 − α), where α 2 = CD/AB (we take the square root with least significant bit 0), and thus
These are the Rosenhain invariants of the curve C, found by Gaudry and Schost [13] , which we are (finally!) ready to define as
The curve constants are the coefficients of
We store the squared theta constants (a : b : c : d), along with (1/a : 1/b : 1/c : 1/d), and (1/A : 1/B : 1/C : 1/D); the Rosenhain invariants λ, µ, and ν, together with λµ and λν; and the curve constants f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , and f 4 , for use in our Kummer and Jacobian arithmetic functions. Obviously, none of the Rosenhain or curve constants are small; multiplying by these costs a full M.
Elements of J C , compressed and decompressed.
Our algorithms use the usual Mumford representation for elements of J C (F q ): they correspond to pairs u(X), v(X) , where u and v are polynomials over F q with u monic, deg v < deg u ≤ 2, and v(X)
2 ≡ f C (X) (mod u(X)). We compute the group operation ⊕ in J C (F q ) using a function ADD, which implements the algorithm found in [14] (after a change of coordinates to meet their Assumption 1) 3 at a cost of 28M + 2S + 11a + 24s + 1I.
For transmission, we compress the 508-bit Mumford representation to a 256-bit form. Our functions compress (Algorithm 1) and decompress (Algorithm 2) implement Stahlke's compression technique (see [25] and [9, App. A] for details).
Algorithm 1: compress: compresses points on J C to 256-bit strings. Symbolic cost: 3M + 1S + 2a + 2s. ATmega: 8 016 cycles. Cortex M0: 2 186 cycles.
The Kummer surface K C
The Kummer surface of C is the quotient K C := J C / ±1 ; points on K C correspond to points on J C taken up to sign. If P is a point in J C , then we write (x P : y P : z P : t P ) = ±P Algorithm 2: decompress: decompresses 256-bit string to a point on J C . Symbolic cost: 46M + 255S + 17a + 12s + 6neg. ATmega: 386 524 cycles Cortex M0: 106 013 cycles Input: A string b0 · · · b255 of 256 bits. Output:
for its image in K C . To avoid subscript explosion, we make the following convention: when points P and Q on J C are clear from the context, we write (x ⊕ : y ⊕ : z ⊕ : t ⊕ ) = ±(P ⊕ Q) and (x : y : z : t ) = ±(P Q) .
The Kummer surface of this C has a "fast" model in P 3 defined by
and E = 4abcd (ABCD/((ad − bc)(ac − bd)(ab − cd))) 2 (see eg. [7] , [8] , and [12] ). The identity point 1, 0 of J C maps to
Algorithm 3 (Project) projects general points from J C (F q ) into K C . The "special" case, where u is linear, is treated in [9, §7.2]. Input:
While the points of K C do not form a group, we have a pseudo-addition operation (differential addition), which computes ±(P ⊕ Q) from ±P , ±Q, and ±(P Q). The function xADD (Algorithm 4) implements the standard differential addition. The special case where P = Q yields a pseudo-doubling operation.
To simplify the presentation of our algorithms, we define three operations on points in P 3 . First, M : P 3 × P 3 → P 3 multiplies the corresponding coordinates of a pair of points:
M : ((x 1 : y 1 : z 1 : t 1 ), (x 2 : y 2 : z 2 : t 2 )) −→ (x 1 x 2 : y 1 y 2 : z 1 z 2 : t 1 t 2 ) .
The special case (x 1 : y 1 : z 1 : t 1 ) = (x 2 : y 2 : z 2 : t 2 ) is denoted by
Finally, the Hadamard transform 4 is defined by H : (x : y : z : t) −→ (x : y : z : t ) where
Clearly M and S, cost 4M and 4S, respectively. The Hadamard transform can easily be implemented with 4a + 4s. However, the additions and subtractions are relatively cheap, making function call overhead a large factor. To minimize this we inline the Hadamard transform, trading a bit of code size for efficiency. Input: (±P, ±Q, ±(P Q)) ∈ K 3 C for some P and Q on J C . Output:
Lines 5 and 6 of Algorithm 4 only involve the third argument, ±(P Q); essentially, they compute the point (y z t : x z t : x y t : x y z ) (which is projectively equivalent to (1/x : 1/y : 1/z : 1/t ), but requires no inversions; note that this is generally not a point on K C ). In practice, the pseudoadditions used in our scalar multiplication all use a fixed third argument, so it makes sense to precompute this "inverted" point and to scale it by x so that the first coordinate is 1, thus saving 7M in each subsequent differential addition for a one-off cost of 1I. The resulting data can be stored as the 3-tuple (x /y , x /z , x /t ), ignoring the trivial first coordinate: this is the wrapped form of ±(P Q). The function xWRAP (Algorithm 5) applies this transformation.
Algorithm 5: xWRAP: (x : y : z : t) → (x/y, x/z, x/t). Symbolic cost: 7M + 1I ATmega: 182 251 cycles. Cortex M0: 49 609 cycles.
Algorithm 6 combines the pseudo-doubling with the differential addition, sharing intermediate operands, to define a differential double-and-add xDBLADD. This is the fundamental building block of the Montgomery ladder. 
Scalar multiplication
All of our cryptographic routines are built around scalar multiplication in J C and pseudo-scalar multiplication in K C . We implement pseudo-scalar multiplication using the classic Montgomery ladder in §4.1. In §4.2, we extend this to full scalar multiplication on J C using the point recovery technique proposed in [9] .
Pseudomultiplication on K C
Since [m]( P ) = [m]P for all m and P , we have a pseudo-scalar multiplication operation (m, ±P ) −→ ±[m]P on K C , which we compute using Algorithm 7 (the Montgomery ladder), implemented as crypto_scalarmult. The loop of Algorithm 7 maintains the following invariant: at the end of iteration i we have
Hence, at the end we return ±[m]P , and also ±[m+1]P as a (free) byproduct. We assume that we have a constant-time conditional swap routine CSWAP(b,
This makes the execution of Algorithm 7 uniform and constant-time, which means it is suitable for use with secret values of m.
Algorithm 7: crypto_scalarmult: Montgomery ladder on K C . Uniform and constant-time: may be used for secret scalars. The point is wrapped. Symbolic cost: (4 + 7β)M + 12βS + 12βm c + 16βa + 16βs, where β = scalar bitlength. ATmega: 9 513 536 cycles. Cortex: 2 633 662 cycles.
Our implementation of crypto_scalarmult assumes that its input Kummer point ±P is wrapped. This follows the approach of [3] . Indeed, many calls to crypto_scalarmult involve Kummer points that are stored or transmitted in wrapped form. However, crypto_scalarmult does require the unwrapped point internally-if only to initialize one variable. We therefore define a function xUNWRAP (Algorithm 8) to invert the xWRAP transformation at a cost of only 4M.
Algorithm 8: xUNWRAP: (x/y, x/z, x/t) → (x : y : z : t). Symbolic cost: 4M. ATmega: 7 297 cycles. Cortex: 2 027 cycles.
4.2 Point recovery from K C to J C Point recovery means efficiently computing [m]P on J C given ±[m]P on K C and some additional information. In our case, the additional information is the base point P and the second output of the Montgomery ladder, ±[m + 1]P . Algorithm 9 (Recover) implements the point recovery algorithm described in [9] . This is the genus-2 analogue of the point recovery methods defined for elliptic curves in [19] , [22] , and [5] .
Algorithm 9: Recover: From K C to J C . Symbolic cost: 139M + 12S + 4m c + 70a + 22s + 3neg + 1I. ATmega: 447 176 cycles. Cortex: 124 936 cycles.
While we refer the reader to [9] for technical details on this method, and proof of its correctness, there is one important mathematical detail that we should mention, since it is reflected in the structure of our code. Namely, point recovery is more naturally computed starting from the general Flynn model K C of the Kummer, because it is more closely related to the Mumford model for J C . Algorithm 9 therefore proceeds in two steps: first we map the problem onto K C using Algorithms 10 and 11 (fast2genFull and fast2genPartial), and then we recover from K C to J C using Algorithm 12 (recoverGeneral).
Since the general Kummer K C only appears briefly in our recovery procedure (we never use its relatively slow arithmetic operations), we will not investigate it any further here-but the curious reader may refer to [6] for the general theory. For our purposes, it suffices to recall that K C is, like K C , embedded in P 3 ; and the isomorphism K C → K C is defined (in eg. [9, §7.4] ) by the linear transformation (x P : y P : z P : t P ) −→ (x P :ỹ P :z P :t P ) := (x P : y P :
where L is (any scalar multiple of) the matrix
which we precompute and store. If ±P is a point on K C , then ±P denotes its image on K C ; we compute ±P using Algorithm 10 (fast2genFull). Sometimes we only require the first three coordinates of ±P . Algorithm 11 (fast2genPartial) saves 4M + 3a per point by not computingt P .
Full scalar multiplication on J C
We now combine our pseudo-scalar multiplication function crypto_scalarmult with the point-recovery function Recover to define a full scalar multiplication function jacobian_scalarmult (Algorithm 13) on J C . Remark 3. We have designed jacobian_scalarmult to take not only a scalar m and a Jacobian point P in its Mumford representation, but also the wrapped form of ±P as an auxiliary argument: that is, we assume that xP ← Project(P ) Input: (P, ±P , ±Q, ±(P ⊕Q), ±(P Q)) ∈ J C × K 4 C for some P and Q in J C . The values oftP ,t⊕, andt are not required. and xWRAP(xP) have already been carried out as a precomputation. This saves redundant Projecting and xWRAPping when we are operating on fixed base points, as is often the case in our protocols. Nevertheless, jacobian_scalarmult could easily be converted to a "pure" Jacobian scalar multiplication function (with no auxiliary input) by inserting appropriate Project and xWRAP calls at the start, and removing the xUNWRAP call at Line 2. These modifications would increase the cost of jacobian_scalarmult by 11M + 1S + 4m c + 7a + 8s + 1I.
Results and comparison
The high-level cryptographic functions for our signature scheme are named keygen, sign and verify. Their implementations contain no surprises: they do exactly what what was specified in §2.1, calling the lower-level functions described in §3 and §4 as required. Our key exchange uses only the function dh_exchange, for both Diffie-Hellman key generation and key exchange. It implements exactly what we specified in §2.2: it is a call to crypto_scalarmult plus a call to xWRAP to convert to the correct 384-bit representation. Table 1 (in the introduction) presents the cycle counts and stack usage for all of our high-level functions.
Code and compilation
In our experiments, the code for the AVR ATmega was compiled with avr-gcc at optimization level -O2. The ARM Cortex M0 code uses the clang compiler, also with optimization level -O2. We experimented with different optimization levels (-O3, -O1, and -Os), but the results were fairly similar. The total size of the program is 20 242 bytes for the AVR ATmega, and 19 606 bytes for the ARM Cortex M0. This consists of the full signature and key-exchange code, including the hash function SHAKE128 implemented with fixed 512-bit output, with the code taken from the reference implementation.
Comparison
As we believe ours to be the first genus-2 hyperelliptic curve implementation on both the AVR ATmega and the ARM Cortex M0 architectures, it is difficult to make a comparison. On the other hand, we may compare with elliptic curvebased alternatives at the same 128-bit security level: notably [28] , [16] , [27] , and [10] . If one is only interested in a key exchange scheme, it is enough to have an object which merely has a differential addition. A well-known example is the Montgomery model for elliptic curves, with very efficient x-coordinate-only arithmetic, which was used in eg. [28] , [16] , and [10] to obtain efficient DiffieHellman key exchange. It is also possible to use x-only arithmetic on Weierstrass curves, as we see in [27] (which is based on the pseudo-addition presented in [5] ). In genus 2, Kummer surfaces have similar properties. Although they only have a pseudo-addition, it is very efficient and therefore highly suitable for key exchange.
If one also wants to implement signatures, differential addition is no longer sufficient. In this case, one has to work with points in an elliptic curve group (or the Jacobian of a genus 2 curve). To still make use of the efficient x-only arithmetic, one must project a point (x, y) to the x-only representation, do a pseudo-scalar multiplication, and then recover the correct y-coordinate of the result. (This is done in [27] using a Weierstrass curve.) As recovery is generally quite slow, this imposes non-negligible overhead.
In genus 2 we can use a completely analogous technique: we project points from the Jacobian to the Kummer surface, use its efficient arithmetic for the scalar multiplication, and recover the correct element of the Jacobian. As in the elliptic case, this does impose some overhead. We therefore only do this when really necessary: that is, for signatures. When computing shared secrets in key exchange, we remain on the Kummer surface. Table 4 . Comparison of scalar multiplication routines on the ARM Cortex M0 architecture at the 128-bit security level. S denotes signature-compatible full scalar multiplication; DH denotes Diffie-Hellman pseudo-scalar multiplication.
As we see in Table 4 , genus-2 techniques give great results for Diffie-Hellman key exchange on the ARM Cortex M0 architecture. Comparing with the current fastest implementation [10] , we reduce the number of clock cycles by about 27%, change required is to the padding, which must take domain separation into account according to [11, p.28] .
while about halving code size and stack usage. For signatures, the state-of-the-art is [27] : here we reduce the cycle count for the underlying scalar multiplications by a very impressive 75%, at the cost of a moderate increase in code size and stack usage. Table 5 . Comparison of scalar multiplication routines on the AVR ATmega architecture at the 128-bit security level. S denotes signature-compatible full scalar multiplication; DH denotes Diffie-Hellman pseudo-scalar multiplication. The implementation marked * also contains a fixed-basepoint scalar multiplication routine, whereas the implementation marked † does not report code size for the separated scalar multiplication.
Looking at Table 5 , on the AVR ATmega architecture we reduce the cycle count for Diffie-Hellman by about 32% compared with the current record [10] , again roughly halving the code size, and reducing stack usage by about 80%. The Jacobian scalar multiplication needed for signatures, reduces the cycle count by 71% compared to [27] , while increasing the stack usage by 25%.
Finally we can compare to the currently fastest full signature implementation [21] , shown in Table 6 . We see that we almost half the number of cycles, while also reducing the stack usage by a decent margin. We do not compare code size, as this is not reported in [21] .
